PQC watch
What your overseas customers will ask for
Selling software to customers in the US, Europe, the UK or Canada? Their governments have set post-quantum dates, and those dates reach Indian vendors through contracts long before any Indian regulator acts. Every row is dated, sourced, and says what it means for you.
| Item | Where it stands | What it means for an Indian vendor | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| US federal agencies: Executive Order 14412 and OMB M-26-15 | Executive Order of 22 June 2026, put into effect by OMB memorandum M-26-15 of 24 June 2026. Agencies must cut as much quantum risk as feasible by 31 December 2030. High-value and high-impact systems must use post-quantum key establishment by 31 December 2030 and post-quantum signatures by 31 December 2031. Agencies must support TLS 1.3 by 2 January 2030. Source: Executive Order 14412 (govinfo), NIST IR 8547, which cites both | If US agencies or their contractors use your product, expect ML-KEM support and TLS 1.3 to become purchase conditions well before 2030. | Binding |
| NIST IR 8547 (US) | Final, 27 October 2026. NIST will deprecate quantum-vulnerable public-key cryptography (RSA and elliptic-curve schemes) after 2030 and disallow it under NIST standards and guidelines after 2035. Source: NIST | The reference schedule most buyers and auditors will quote, inside and outside the US. Products validated against NIST standards need a post-quantum path by 2030. | Final |
| NSA CNSA 2.0 (US national security systems) | Announced September 2022. Software and firmware signing, and networking equipment, to use CNSA 2.0 algorithms exclusively by 2030; web browsers, servers and cloud services by 2033; all national security systems quantum-resistant by 2035. Source: NSA advisory (PDF), Nextgov | Applies only if you supply US defence or intelligence systems, directly or through a prime contractor. Firmware signing is the earliest hard date. | Binding |
| EU coordinated roadmap | Adopted by Member States with the Commission, published 23 June 2025. Every Member State to complete its first steps by the end of 2026; high-risk uses to stop relying on quantum-vulnerable public-key methods alone by the end of 2030; medium-risk uses by the end of 2035, with as many systems as practically feasible by then. Source: European Commission | A recommendation to governments, not a law on companies. EU banks and public bodies will still pass it on to suppliers as requirements, starting with high-risk systems. | Advisory |
| UK NCSC migration timelines | Published 20 March 2025. By 2028: set goals, finish discovering what uses quantum-vulnerable cryptography, and draft a plan. By 2031: finish the highest-priority migrations. By 2035: migrate everything. Source: NCSC | UK customers will start with discovery, which means asking suppliers what cryptography their products use. A CBOM answers that. | Advisory |
| Canada: Government of Canada roadmap (ITSM.40.001) | Published June 2025, in effect 23 June 2025, for federal departments' non-classified systems. Initial migration plans by April 2026, then yearly progress reports; high-priority systems migrated by the end of 2031, the rest by the end of 2035. Source: Canadian Centre for Cyber Security | Matters if you sell to Canadian federal departments. Their inventories and plans are due now, so supplier questionnaires come first. | Watching |