PQC watch

What your overseas customers will ask for

Selling software to customers in the US, Europe, the UK or Canada? Their governments have set post-quantum dates, and those dates reach Indian vendors through contracts long before any Indian regulator acts. Every row is dated, sourced, and says what it means for you.

Last checked 19 November 2026 next check by 19 February 2027

ItemWhere it standsWhat it means for an Indian vendorStatus
US federal agencies: Executive Order 14412 and OMB M-26-15 Executive Order of 22 June 2026, put into effect by OMB memorandum M-26-15 of 24 June 2026. Agencies must cut as much quantum risk as feasible by 31 December 2030. High-value and high-impact systems must use post-quantum key establishment by 31 December 2030 and post-quantum signatures by 31 December 2031. Agencies must support TLS 1.3 by 2 January 2030. Source: Executive Order 14412 (govinfo), NIST IR 8547, which cites both If US agencies or their contractors use your product, expect ML-KEM support and TLS 1.3 to become purchase conditions well before 2030. Binding
NIST IR 8547 (US) Final, 27 October 2026. NIST will deprecate quantum-vulnerable public-key cryptography (RSA and elliptic-curve schemes) after 2030 and disallow it under NIST standards and guidelines after 2035. Source: NIST The reference schedule most buyers and auditors will quote, inside and outside the US. Products validated against NIST standards need a post-quantum path by 2030. Final
NSA CNSA 2.0 (US national security systems) Announced September 2022. Software and firmware signing, and networking equipment, to use CNSA 2.0 algorithms exclusively by 2030; web browsers, servers and cloud services by 2033; all national security systems quantum-resistant by 2035. Source: NSA advisory (PDF), Nextgov Applies only if you supply US defence or intelligence systems, directly or through a prime contractor. Firmware signing is the earliest hard date. Binding
EU coordinated roadmap Adopted by Member States with the Commission, published 23 June 2025. Every Member State to complete its first steps by the end of 2026; high-risk uses to stop relying on quantum-vulnerable public-key methods alone by the end of 2030; medium-risk uses by the end of 2035, with as many systems as practically feasible by then. Source: European Commission A recommendation to governments, not a law on companies. EU banks and public bodies will still pass it on to suppliers as requirements, starting with high-risk systems. Advisory
UK NCSC migration timelines Published 20 March 2025. By 2028: set goals, finish discovering what uses quantum-vulnerable cryptography, and draft a plan. By 2031: finish the highest-priority migrations. By 2035: migrate everything. Source: NCSC UK customers will start with discovery, which means asking suppliers what cryptography their products use. A CBOM answers that. Advisory
Canada: Government of Canada roadmap (ITSM.40.001) Published June 2025, in effect 23 June 2025, for federal departments' non-classified systems. Initial migration plans by April 2026, then yearly progress reports; high-priority systems migrated by the end of 2031, the rest by the end of 2035. Source: Canadian Centre for Cyber Security Matters if you sell to Canadian federal departments. Their inventories and plans are due now, so supplier questionnaires come first. Watching